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vFOREWORD
The security relationship between the United States 
and Afghanistan will undergo significant change over 
the next year. Domestic issues in both countries will 
shape that new relationship, as well as regional issues 
within and between key neighbors of Afghanistan. 
During the 2014 State of the Union Address, President 
Barack Obama said: 
After 2014, we will support a unified Afghanistan as 
it takes responsibility for its own future. . . ., a small 
force of Americans could remain in Afghanistan with 
NATO allies to carry out two narrow missions: train-
ing and assisting Afghan forces, and counterterrorism 
operations to pursue any remnants of al Qaeda.1 
This statement will inform U.S. policy and the new 
security relationship with Afghanistan from a U.S. 
perspective. From an Afghan perspective, the transi-
tion of the presidency from Hamid Karzai to one of 
the two final candidates (Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai 
or Abdullah Abdullah) who competed in the June 
14, 2014, second round elections will be the defining 
event shaping the new relationship. This monograph 
offers insightful analysis and practical recommenda-
tions for a strategy to shape the new U.S.–Afghanistan 
relationship.
As part of their research design, Dr. Larry Good-
son and Dr. Thomas Johnson augmented their person-
al analysis with insights gathered from a wargaming 
workshop conducted at the U.S. Army War College’s 
Center for Strategic Leadership and Development 
(CSLD) in January 2014. Subject matter experts repre-
senting military, academic, and policymaking perspec-
tives offered thoughts on the research questions posed 
by the authors as they were led through the wargam-
ing scenarios by CSLD facilitators. This broad-based 
exchange of ideas deepened and enriched the analysis 
and recommendations presented here.
The authors offer national security leaders impor-
tant and timely insights, as a start-point for developing 
more detailed strategy and policies that will define the 
new U.S.–Afghanistan relationship. They ground their 
study in a brief analysis of the successes and failures 
of U.S. policy in Afghanistan since 2001. From there, 
they examine the changing contours of the current 
domestic, regional, and global security environments 
influencing U.S. policy and strategy choices. Relying 
on a “clean slate” assessment of U.S. interests and con-
straints emerging from this environmental scan, they 
identify four important U.S. national security interests 
that exist in and around Afghanistan. Those interests 
are: 1) Contain or prevent the threat of terrorist attacks 
on the homeland or American interests abroad; 2) Pre-
vent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
from the region; 3) Ensure regional stability; and, 4) 
Forestall rising peer competitors in the region. Finally, 
they conclude by offering a broad three-part strategy 
for post-2014 Afghanistan: 1) Finish destroying al-
Qaeda; 2) Continue rebuilding Afghanistan; and, 3) 
Regionalize strategy.
This monograph was completed in April 2014, and 
therefore does not include mention of more recent de-
velopments such as the U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security 
Agreement. However, the problems and themes it de-
scribes are permanent ones, and continue to present 
important considerations for protecting the interests 




By publishing this timely analysis in concert with 
the presidential leadership transition in Afghani-
stan, the U.S. Army War College hopes to generate 
an informed and reflective public debate on U.S.– 
Afghanistan security strategy post-2014.
   
   DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
   Director
   Strategic Studies Institute and
        U.S. Army War College Press
ENDNOTE - FOREWORD
1. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address. 
Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
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As the United States continues to withdraw troops 
from and prepares to leave Afghanistan, Afghanistan 
faces multifaceted and significant challenges of gov-
ernance, economy, security, and regional dynamics. 
These are all occurring within the context of the po-
tential for an expanded civil war when international 
forces leave the country. It is time to refocus from the 
conflict itself and ask hard, but realistic, strategic and 
policy questions as to the future of Afghanistan, and 
what role, if any, the United States should play in 
shaping that future. 
After nearly 13 years, over 2,200 lives lost, and 
over U.S.$650 billion spent since the United States be-
gan its air campaign against Afghanistan’s Taliban in 
October 2001, the end of the long American military 
campaign in Afghanistan appears to be in sight. De-
spite the cost and challenges, the reality that Afghani-
stan still ranks consistently in the bottom 10 countries 
for human development and corruption, and the un-
even but clear progress that the country has made in 
many areas, the United States will soon scale down its 
involvement in Afghanistan, and quite possibly pull 
all uniformed military forces out of Afghanistan quite 
rapidly. Additionally, the widely reported corrup-
tion that exists throughout the Afghan government, 
the resilient Taliban-led insurgency, and a litany of 
Western blunders, mishaps, and tragedies have all 
helped to undermine Western interest in the Afghan 
War. Recent surveys suggest that public support for 
the war is dwindling in Western and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries, with 
75 percent of European respondents and 68 percent 
of U.S. respondents supporting either withdrawal or 
immediate troop reductions according to the German 
Marshall Fund Annual Transatlantic Trends Survey. 
Alternatively, perhaps the declining interest in Af-
ghanistan is connected to a widespread popular and 
policymaker belief, especially since the 2011 Abbot-
tabad raid (Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR) that killed 
Osama bin Laden, that U.S. and NATO war aims in 
Afghanistan have been achieved, or at least achieved 
to a sufficient degree given the current fiscal and 
political climate.
This monograph answers six key questions about 
U.S. policy and strategy for Afghanistan:
1. Did the United States have or develop criti-
cal national interests in Afghanistan and its imme-
diate neighborhood on or because of the events of 
September 11, 2001?
2. Was overall U.S. strategy to pursue those inter-
ests successful and appropriate?
3. What outside conditions shaping U.S. involve-
ment in Afghanistan exist now?
4. Do new vital and/or important national interests 
not met by our earlier strategies exist in this region?
5. What strategy(s) should the United States adopt 
or emphasize to achieve any vital and/or important 
national interests in/around Afghanistan?
6. What risks and challenges are associated with 
new policies and/or strategies?
The authors’ answers to these questions pro-
vide the foundation for recommendations to U.S. 
policy and strategy in order to achieve current and 
future national security interests in the regions that 
Afghanistan straddles.
xiv
1U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGY TOWARD 
AFGHANISTAN AFTER 2014
Introduction.
The United States will soon reach a major inflec-
tion point in its long and trying post-September 11, 
2001 (9/11) engagement with Afghanistan. In order 
to make certain that our policy and strategy going 
forward allows us to achieve key national interests in 
the most effective way, we must carefully consider the 
past policies and strategies with regard to Afghani-
stan and the surrounding region, the current condi-
tions that constrain and influence our capabilities, as 
well as overall U.S. global interests.
Afghanistan has not been a success story for the 
United States to date; nor has it been an unmitigated 
disaster. Some national interests have been achieved, 
but the cost in so doing has been high, and it has taken 
a long time. As with any military action, covert op-
eration, diplomatic initiative, or development project; 
accidents, cost overruns, excesses, inefficiencies, and 
just plain mistakes have undermined public confi-
dence and called into question our overall Afghani-
stan policy. The deep-seated and chronic corruption 
and graft of the Afghan government and its rampant 
inefficiency has also proven problematic. Future pol-
icy and strategy toward Afghanistan must take into 
account not only the successes already achieved, but 
also the costs and shortcomings incurred in achieving 
those successes.
2National Interests after 9/11.1
Prior to 9/11, American policy toward Afghani-
stan had been largely to ignore what was a Central 
Asian backwater, outside of American alliance struc-
tures and essentially a remote and deeply underdevel-
oped extension of the Soviet Central Asian republics. 
Indeed, for virtually all of Afghan history with the 
exception of the Soviet occupation period (1979-89), 
U.S. policy toward the country and its surrounding re-
gion was to treat it as a minor and peripheral interest.2 
Little could occur there of consequence to the United 
States. After the attacks on the United States on 9/11, 
immediate policy changes toward Afghanistan and 
the terrorists harboring there were enacted, especially 
with regard to the Afghan Taliban. 
The year 1979 proved to be a watershed in U.S. re-
lations with Afghanistan and the South Asian region. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Day 
1979 presented the United States with an opportunity 
to “bleed” the Soviet Union, which had become a per-
sistent and unremitting rival during the Cold War. 
Also, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and dissolution 
of the Central Treaty Organization in 1979 combined 
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to prompt 
the 1980 Carter Doctrine and limited covert proxy 
war fought by the United States in Afghanistan in the 
1980s. Despite that, the United States had no truly vi-
tal national interests in Afghanistan. The covert war 
was pursued as a strategy in support of what became 
known in 1985 as the Reagan Doctrine, which commit-
ted the United States to aid anti-communist fighters in 
the developing world against Soviet-supported dicta-
torial regimes. This, of course, was in direct contradic-
tion to the Brezhnev Doctrine which called on the So-
3viet Union to directly support any fledgling Socialist 
regime on its borders. 
Evidence for our limited policy interests in Afghan-
istan was abundant at the end of the 1980s. After a de-
cade of successful covert and other operations contrib-
uted to driving the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan 
in 1989, we reverted to our traditional posture toward 
the country and treated it as a minor backwater as we 
turned our foreign policy focus elsewhere. Afghani-
stan staggered on throughout the 1990s, bedeviled by 
persistent civil war between rapacious warlords and 
Islamist Taliban, with some involvement of outside 
actors. Although the United States was aware of the 
increasingly dangerous al-Qaeda terrorists operating 
in and from Afghanistan during the latter half of the 
1990s, we were unsuccessful at eliminating or con-
taining that threat, until 9/11 forced a change to U.S. 
policy virtually overnight. Two vital national interests 
immediately came into being:
1. Destroy al-Qaeda and degrade its network of 
support, both to exact retribution and to prevent its 
ability to do further harm to the United States; and,
2. Make it impossible for anti-American terrorists 
to operate again from Afghanistan or its immediate 
neighborhood.
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) begin-
ning in 2001 as part of the broader Global War on 
Terror (GWOT) was the most obvious manifestation 
of a U.S. policy change toward Afghanistan that now 
elevated the country and its problems to the very fore-
front of U.S. foreign policy concerns and national in-
terests. The foremost objective of U.S. policy in this era 
was to destroy anti-American terrorist organizations, 
especially those that might pursue weapons of mass 
4destruction (WMD), and to degrade their sources of 
support in countries that were perceived to be aligned 
against U.S. interests. That policy interest led the Unit-
ed States to invade Iraq in 2003 and topple the Sad-
dam Hussein regime there, as well as to attack primar-
ily Islamist terrorists in various locations around the 
world, especially Pakistan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, 
North Africa, and Southeast Asia. These approaches 
appeared to follow the 2002 National Security Strategy 
that emphasized we would “strengthen alliances to 
defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks 
against us and our friends.”3 
Strategy after 9/11.
Strategy is the calculated relationship between 
ends, ways, and means, with the risk of the variable 
being affected when that relationship is unbalanced. 
Strategy can be measured by its feasibility, acceptabil-
ity, and suitability, as follows:
•  Suitability—will its attainment accomplish the 
effect desired (relates to objective)?
•  Feasibility—can the action be accomplished by 
the means available (relates to concept)?
•  Acceptability—are the consequences of cost 
justified by the importance of the effect desired 
(relates to resources/concept)?4
The challenge posed by the 9/11 attack on the 
United States was in rapidly developing an effective 
strategy(s) to achieve the radically changed policy 
objectives outlined earlier.
Realistically, however, the U.S. national security 
architecture was not constructed to respond to the 
threat posed by Islamist terrorists or the nation-build-
5ing activities that our military interventions in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq necessitated. Almost from the very 
beginning of our increased involvement in Afghani-
stan, strategic incoherence dominated our approach. 
Ultimately, nation-building5 in Afghanistan (and Iraq) 
seemed to involve three primary lines of effort: secu-
rity, governance, and economic development.6 Each 
of those lines of effort came to be led by a particular 
part and sometimes more than one part of the U.S. 
Government. 
Over time, four major strategic approaches would 
be adopted for Afghanistan. From the beginning, we 
focused on counterterrorism (CT) against the al-Qaeda 
and Taliban who attacked us and/or the Kabul gov-
ernment that we put in place of the Taliban early in 
OEF. The intelligence community, especially the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the military spe-
cial operations community, primarily led this strategy, 
which focused on “High-Value Targets” (HVTs). As 
the country of Afghanistan was essentially underde-
veloped and without a functioning government when 
we intervened, we also devised a strategic approach 
that emphasized nation-building activities, despite the 
fact that President George W. Bush had campaigned 
for the presidency in 2000 against nation-building. No 
part of the U.S. Government mastered state-building 
(or governmental and institutional development) and 
economic development, so the State Department had 
the lead in engaging with the rest of the international 
community in these areas. Not surprisingly, given the 
widespread needs and institutional inadequacies in-
side Afghanistan, plus the multitude of outside actors 
that accepted responsibility for different components 
of the nation-building process, progress was uneven 
and slow. Security sector reform was also a compo-
6nent of Afghan institution building on which the U.S. 
military eventually had most of the lead, while it was 
also engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan.7 
Later, after the apparent success of counterinsurgency 
(COIN) operations in Iraq, the United States surged 
forces into Afghanistan and attempted a similar ap-
proach there, meaning that elements of the Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) had a hand in four strategic 
approaches.8
The cost of this complex, overlapping, and often-
times divergent infrastructure for success in Afghani-
stan paradoxically made that success harder to achieve. 
The heavy emphasis on CT efforts, replicated in Iraq, 
meant we abandoned the moral high ground almost 
from the outset in order to pursue frequently classi-
fied “capture-kill” operations and then to imprison 
individuals captured thereby in “black” detention/
rendition facilities in Afghanistan, third countries, or 
Guantanamo Bay. 
We also supported numerous warlords and de-
layed the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rein-
tegration (DDR) of their militias in order to utilize 
their forces against the Taliban, who had fled across 
the Durand Line into Pakistan, putting them initially 
outside the reach of American CT efforts. Our nation-
building efforts were hamstrung by a lack of commit-
ment, inadequate institutional capacity, and the huge 
challenges posed by Afghanistan’s virtually complete 
absence of a functional infrastructure due to its long 
years of destructive war. Moreover, in the first half 
of the 2000s, we allowed a division of labor of the 
nation-building mission to a United Nations that we 
clearly held in disdain, as well as organizations like 
the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, plus 
bilateral partners. Clumsy but well-intended initial ef-
7forts to repair, rebuild, or even reinvent Afghanistan 
after a generation’s worth of war were soon overtak-
en by the relentless pace of the U.S. intervention in 
Iraq, which relegated Afghanistan to a back burner. 
Centrifugal forces associated more with localism than 
nationalism had become resurgent during the many 
years of war, and in the absence of functioning institu-
tions provided the foundation for Afghanistan’s next 
chapter. Thus, even as a government was established, 
constitution written, ministries reinvigorated, and 
trust funds created, the Afghan government became 
an out-of-control hodgepodge of kleptocratic, incestu-
ous, and corrupt thugs who plundered the treasury 
of its foreign largesse for their own, oftentimes dubi-
ous, ends. Inevitably, and over time, the Afghan gov-
ernment proved its ineptitude. The insurgencies and 
violent opposition it engendered grew more intense. 
Therefore, military operations to defeat the opposition 
grew more complex and required more troops, and 
cross-border efforts to strike the Taliban in their sanc-
tuaries began in 2004 and leaped in intensity in 2008.
Notwithstanding all the difficulties, most Ameri-
cans have come to believe that our Afghanistan strat-
egies have achieved our post-9/11 national interests, 
or at least as much as they are likely to. Al-Qaeda has 
been the object of an unremitting capture/kill cam-
paign for over 12 years, with virtually all of the top 
leadership of what was always a very small group 
taken off the battlefield prior to the 2011 Abbottabad 
Raid that caused the death of Osama bin Laden. Al-
though Ayman Al-Zawahiri assumed the leadership 
of al-Qaeda after Bin Laden’s death, most Americans 
felt that the Abbottabad Raid meant that the core al-
Qaeda organization was no longer a serious threat to 
the United States and that retribution for 9/11 had 
8finally been exacted. As for making Afghanistan no 
longer hospitable to anti-American terrorists, that was 
supposed to be accomplished by the institutional and 
economic development of the country that was to oc-
cur by virtue of the Bonn Process and the repeated 
international conferences aimed at raising funding for 
Afghanistan development. Unfortunately, the Bonn 
Process provided for a model of graduated transi-
tion to constitutional government that would take 
time and was not well understood by many Afghans. 
This essentially meant that while Security Sector Re-
form and other institutional developments were being 
pursued as long-term projects, human capital devel-
opment would need at least a generation to begin to 
offset the lost generation of the 1980s and 1990s. As 
the nation-building process dragged on and grew 
more expensive, however, it also became increasing-
ly obvious that most Afghans who engaged in anti-
American violence saw themselves as resistance fight-
ers or were pursuing violence for economic gain or, 
if they were inspired by religious ideology, perceived 
themselves as engaged in a defensive jihad.9 Thus, 
there seems to be little likelihood that significant at-
tacks on the American homeland will originate from 
Afghanistan again. 
Despite the success (or exhaustion) achieved by 
U.S. strategies in securing American interests in Af-
ghanistan—albeit at great expense and to some extent 
imperfectly—the Afghan War has been our nation’s 
longest war and it has inevitably led to changed con-
ditions in the region, which arguably have created 
new national interests there. This mission creep is a 
by-product of a changing regional environment that 
has seen the emergence of a multipolar scramble for 
Central Asia in which all the regional powers are tak-
ing part,10 usually pursuing divergent interests. 
9Meanwhile, a global economic downturn has 
spurred on not only the regional competition for Af-
ghan and Central Asian resources but exacerbated 
Western publics’ war-weariness with the Afghan 
imbroglio (indeed, all military interventions, if the 
recent disquiet over Syria, Ukraine, and Iraq are any-
thing to go by!). Moreover, the apparently successful 
use of drones, Special Forces, and other light footprint 
technologies and approaches in Afghanistan and else-
where suggest to many that such national interests, 
as do exist in Afghanistan’s neighborhood, might be 
managed by those means.
Outside Conditions.
Before turning our attention to post-2014 U.S. in-
terest, policies, and strategies, we should consider 
how the past 13 years have changed conditions shap-
ing U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. At least four 
major factors deserve attention: the modern-day mul-
tipolarity of the region (the “new Great Game”); the 
war-weariness among Western publics; the techno-
logical and military advances that have made counter-
terrorism less labor-intensive, reducing the required 
footprint; and the fragile economic conditions across 
the globe. Some of these conditions may serve as con-
straints on U.S. or other outside action, although pre-
sumably they do not affect fundamental U.S. interests. 
As constraints, however, they deserve attention.
Today, the United States plays the dominant role 
in the region, but a rising China, emerging India, ac-
tive Pakistan, reemerging Russia, troubled Iran, and 
other regional players all are actively engaged in 
Afghanistan, as well as multilateral and non-govern-
mental organizations. While not all of these countries 
10
and outside actors have divergent interests, enough 
do such that Afghanistan has become a playing field 
in a multipolar struggle between regional and great 
powers.11 
China and India are increasingly competing in a 
rivalry for Asian dominance. The more obvious mani-
festation of that competition has been the naval and 
maritime race for supremacy in the Indian Ocean and 
littoral areas of Southeast and East Asia, but desire 
for natural resources and geographic position have 
brought China and India into Central Asia as well. 
China has invested more than $5 billion in Afghani-
stan to date, primarily in the Aynak copper mine and 
in winning bids to develop oil tracts in Faryab and 
Sar-i-Pul. India has a broader and deeper relationship 
with Afghanistan, having signed a strategic partner-
ship in 2011. India has also built roads and other infra-
structure in Afghanistan, refurbished and upgraded 
the Chabahar port in Iran in 2009 and the road from 
there to the Afghan border town of Zaranj in order to 
weaken Afghan dependence on Pakistani access to the 
outside world, and sponsored Afghanistan’s mem-
bership in the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) since 2006. Indian companies 
have made more than $2 billion in investments in Af-
ghanistan, especially the successful bid for the bulk of 
the Hajigak iron ore in Bamiyan. The Hajigak bid is 
the centerpiece of an expected $10.7 billion in invest-
ment over the next 30 years, as well as more than one 
billion dollars in aid since 2002.
Pakistan has neither the resources as India or Chi-
na nor the same strategic approach toward Afghani-
stan. Nonetheless, Pakistan considers itself to be the 
immediate neighbor that has suffered the most due to 
Afghanistan’s turbulent history and is thus most enti-
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tled to a stable Afghanistan that is favorably disposed 
to it. That is, Pakistan wants a Pashtun government 
in Kabul that will not pursue policies that it consid-
ers inimical to its interests. Therefore, it intends to use 
the Taliban as its cat’s paw in Afghanistan, either as a 
militia in a future civil war, or as a partner in a future 
Afghan government. Similarly, Iran wants to preserve 
its influence in western Afghanistan, where there is 
not a strong enough agent to contend for power or 
power-sharing in Kabul. Iran has helped to develop 
its own route into Afghanistan in concert with India, 
as mentioned already, in order to offset Pakistan’s in-
fluence through Afghanistan’s southern and eastern 
Pashtun belt. 
Russia has less direct influence in Afghanistan, 
but it fears another resurgence of militant Islamism 
there and it has extensive investment in the oil and 
gas infrastructure in the other Central Asian states 
north of Afghanistan. Russia also fears the expansion 
of Chinese influence in Central Asia. Russia, Iran, and 
Pakistan have all become important transit routes for 
Afghanistan’s heroin, and not surprisingly, have de-
veloped large populations of drug addicts. Thus, all 
three countries want Afghanistan’s drug economy 
brought under control. Russia’s former satellites, Af-
ghanistan’s northern neighbors Tajikistan, Uzbeki-
stan, and Turkmenistan (as well as Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan), also suffer from the drug trafficking and 
the possibility of rising Islamist militancy, plus they 
are caught geographically in the scramble for Central 
Asian gas and oil resources, with the prospect of pipe-
lines and transit corridors coming from all points of 
the compass and all major regional players. 
The Gulf Arab states have little direct influence 
inside Afghanistan but subscribe to the proverbial 
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wisdom that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” 
meaning the Gulf Arab states generally oppose ad-
vances to Iran’s interests in Afghanistan. Finally, the 
United States and its NATO partners have invested 
far more money in Afghanistan than anyone else, but 
now face a heightened war-weariness that has caused 
a loss of political will to remain there. 
This war-weariness means that the Afghan im-
broglio appears to be reaching its end in terms of sig-
nificant involvement of major Western powers. Public 
opinion data from across NATO countries—and the 
United States is especially relevant—show unequivo-
cally that Western publics consider the Afghan War to 
be complete. Western support for the Afghan War had 
declined steadily from 2003 onward, but almost from 
the beginning of the Obama administration in early 
2009 popular opinion passed the threshold of more 
people being opposed than favored the deployment 
of troops there.12 Since then, popular opinion has con-
tinued on its downward trend, accelerating somewhat 
after the May 2011 Abbottabad Raid that killed Osama 
Bin Laden. As the poll results reveal, 66% of Ameri-
cans believe the Afghan War is not worth fighting 
now, although public opinion remains divided about 
whether to remove all troops there.13
The 2012 Transatlantic Trends Survey of the Ger-
man Marshall Fund showed that 68% of Americans 
and 75% of survey respondents from European Union 
countries believed then “that troop levels should be re-
duced or troops should be withdrawn altogether from 
Afghanistan.”14 However, the 2013 Survey showed 
that 53% of Europeans and 54% of Americans favored 
keeping some troops in Afghanistan to train the Af-
ghan army and police.15 The timetable already in place 
for a gradual drawdown of Western troops means that 
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Western unease about the continuing involvement in 
Afghanistan may be somewhat mollified by the ex-
pectation that the war is gradually coming to a close. 
Some support remains for limited troop deployments 
into the future, as already indicated; that support 
seems to be motivated by a continuing concern over 
the threat of Islamist terrorism against Americans and 
not due to geopolitics or other possible national in-
terests. The mixed feelings concerning Afghanistan by 
the American public were on wide display during the 
raging debate over the release from Taliban captivity 
of SGT Bowe Bergdahl. Bergdahl, of the U.S. Army, 
was held captive by the Taliban-aligned Haqqani net-
work in Afghanistan from June 2009 until his release 
in May 2014. The release was part of a controversial 
five-for-one prisoner trade with the Taliban that the 
Obama administration secretly orchestrated with the 
Taliban through Qatar.
14
In 2012, Washington announced a highly publi-
cized “pivot to the Pacific,” or strategic rebalancing 
of American diplomatic and defense focus onto the 
Western Pacific Rim, signaling that America’s post-
2001 fixation on the Islamic World and its threatening 
radicals was over.16 Yet, those radicals remain danger-
ous and they still appear intent on striking the United 
States and U.S. interests. Moreover, the worsening 
Syrian and Iraqi civil wars and the apparent con-
tinuing march of the Iranian regime toward a viable 
nuclear weapons program present the United States 
with national security challenges in the Islamic World 
that cannot be ignored. “Light footprint” military and 
intelligence approaches straight from the ancient wis-
dom of Kautilya17 provide ways and means for dealing 
with those challenges, but at significant philosophical 
and moral cost for the United States.18
At least some national security threats may be dif-
ferent in nature than traditional threats, perhaps be-
cause they emanate from non-state actors with at least 
aspirations of utilizing weapons of mass destruction. 
Or, perhaps U.S. capabilities and/or doctrine are such 
that the best response to these threats is non-tradition-
al, leaning less on conventional armies and navies (or 
even strategic nuclear forces) and more on armed un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs), cyber attacks, direct 
action (i.e., targeted killings), clandestine operations, 
information operations, and leveraging of unique 
capabilities possessed by allied and/or friendly 
countries. 
A significant challenge, though, is that nontradi-
tional ways of war may still constitute acts of war. 
What does that mean for the widely reported cross-
border drone operations from Afghanistan into Paki-
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stan? Pakistan is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) 
that also provides the cheapest and most effective sup-
ply lines by which the United States continues to sup-
ply its forces in landlocked Afghanistan. Given these 
circumstances, no formal mechanism by the U.S. gov-
ernment to provide a legal basis for military or para-
military action inside Pakistan has been announced, 
although many Americans might view such acts and 
approaches to be appropriate. The strategic divide in 
the American approach to Afghanistan between CT 
and state building combined with the ability of most 
of the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters to escape to Paki-
stan in the early stages of the Afghan War led inevi-
tably to U.S. cross-border operations in Pakistan, an 
MNNA country, sometimes in conjunction with the 
Pakistani government (although not acknowledged 
to the Pakistani public) and sometimes without Paki-
stani approval or foreknowledge. 
This seeming conundrum, which some would 
call duplicity, occurred because Pakistan viewed 
the asymmetric actors operating from its territory as 
its only effective offensive tools in its long-standing 
struggle with India. Thus, Pakistan wanted to main-
tain them and even use them against rising Indian 
influence within Afghanistan, but maintaining those 
actors caused problems with the Americans inside 
Afghanistan to whom Pakistan was ostensibly al-
lied. Moreover, the grudging decision by Pakistani 
President Pervez Musharraf in 2001 to be “with” 
rather than “against” the United States in Afghanistan 
caused many of the Islamist terrorist groups within 
Pakistan to turn against the Pakistani government.19 
Consequently, at least some of the Pakistani national 
security leadership wanted the United States to attack 
certain targets within Pakistan, most notably those an-
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ti-Pakistani government Islamist militants operating 
out of the quasi-autonomous Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) that abut Afghanistan, even as 
those same leaders kept certain other asymmetric ac-
tors from being captured or killed, primarily by keep-
ing them in secure locations outside of the FATA. Thus, 
since 2004 the United States has conducted more than 
370 drone strikes causing at least 2,000 deaths inside 
Pakistan,20 even as the Afghan insurgency against the 
Karzai government intensified, bolstered by its cross-
border sanctuary and support. The United States 
has also conducted cross-border raids, most notably 
Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR that killed Osama bin 
Laden in May 2011.
This method of counterterrorism, which relies pri-
marily on unconventional forces, clandestine intelli-
gence gathering, and new technology, has proven to 
be effective in this unique situation.21 President Barack 
Obama embraced this approach to warfare early in 
his first term in office, accelerating a program of strik-
ing Pakistani-based militants with missiles fired from 
drones that had begun under President Bush in June 
2004 and continued very selectively until the latter 
half of 2008, when the Bush administration ramped 
up the pace of these strikes, more than doubling the 
number of attacks in the last 6 months of 2008 than 
had occurred in the previous 4 years. The Obama ad-
ministration introduced a surge of U.S. troops into Af-
ghanistan starting in 2009, but its tactic of choice was 
the cross-border drone strike into Pakistani territory, 
with President Obama himself reportedly personally 
approving the targets of the strikes.22
“Light footprint” CT of this sort that has been used 
in Pakistan (and elsewhere) is seductive to policymak-
ers, especially in an austere fiscal climate when the 
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largest segment of the U.S. Government’s discretion-
ary spending has been its defense budget. Cheaper 
tools and capabilities of war may move America far-
ther and farther away from the traditional “American 
way of war” into an era of near-permanent, silent war, 
tucked away from public scrutiny in the shadows.23 If 
so, Afghanistan and its neighborhood has already be-
come the arena for America’s new “light footprint” ap-
proach to addressing national security threats, which 
presumably may be sufficient for dealing with those 
now-reduced threats and allowing American military 
forces to be deployed elsewhere.
Moreover, eroding economic conditions now exist 
that constrain U.S. policy and strategy choices and tip 
American leaders toward more limited approaches 
to war. The global economic downturn that began in 
late-2007 both spread and persisted, creating an aus-
tere economic climate in the United States that com-
bined with expensive wars paid for by supplemental 
appropriations and growing entitlement burdens on 
the shrinking fiscal side of the budget. By 2014, the 
economic realities were such that military spending—
the largest discretionary item in the budget—was set 
for a substantial cut. In particular, the ground forces 
(especially the Army) face significant cuts in overall 
strength, as the rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific com-
bines with the Air-Sea Battle concept to motivate most 
military spending on the expensive aircraft and ships 
of the Air Force and Navy.24 
Thus, if new wars must be fought in the near 
term, they cannot be fought in the same way as the 
wars of the first decade of the 21st century, as the 
military structure will not exist with which to do so. 
Moreover, the expensive and seemingly interminable 
nation-building operations conducted in Afghani-
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stan and Iraq no longer appear to be sustainable by 
U.S. military and other government assets. Indeed, 
the overall weakening of many national economies, 
especially those of practically every NATO country 
involved in Afghanistan, has further reduced pub-
lic willingness to fund an ongoing war or nation-
building effort there. To the extent that certain na-
tional security interests remain in Afghanistan, less 
costly ways will have to be found to achieve those 
interests.
As has already been detailed, initial U.S. inter-
ests were largely achieved by expensive, poorly syn-
chronized, often redundant strategic approaches in 
Afghanistan. Future strategic approaches, in a time 
of greater economic austerity and after the longest 
war in American history, are no longer deemed to be 
necessary by the American public. Simply put, most 
Americans no longer believe having troops or exten-
sive investments in Afghanistan are worth it.
Current National Interests.
Four important national security interests now 
exist in and around Afghanistan:
1. Contain or prevent the threat of terrorist attacks 
on the homeland or American interests abroad;
2. Prevent the proliferation of WMD from the 
region;
3. Ensure regional stability; and,
4. Forestall rising peer competitors in the region.
The primary national interest that American in-
volvement in Afghanistan has pursued since 9/11 
has been national security, as both the CT approaches 
toward individual terrorists and insurgents and the 
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organizations to which they belong, and the state-
building approaches toward Afghan institutions, were 
all meant to advance U.S. national security. Now, al-
Qaeda in the Afghanistan region is a hollow shell of 
its former self, requiring little in the way of continued 
military attention. Afghan nation-building has prov-
en to be both exceedingly unpopular with the public 
and unlikely to ripen quickly enough to be a success-
ful strategy. Both tasks are unfinished, but neither of 
them is important enough to warrant continued deep 
involvement by the United States, and both of them 
really represent ways to achieve U.S. national security 
interests in Afghanistan.
On the other hand, the rising regional competi-
tion between Asian powers (China, Russia, and India) 
and regional powers (Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Ara-
bia) has important ramifications for the United States. 
Thus, four national security interests now exist in and 
around Afghanistan. First, protecting U.S. national 
security by containing or preventing the threat of ter-
rorist attacks on the homeland or American interests 
abroad remains important, even if the likelihood of 
that threat emanating from Afghanistan or its neigh-
borhood has declined. In particular, destroying al-Qa-
eda and other violent Islamist organizations operating 
near Afghanistan remains an important priority, but 
al-Qaeda in this region is so degraded today that this 
task only requires a limited CT capability. Likewise, 
Afghanistan still must be rebuilt, but only insofar as 
it helps insulate Afghanistan from further threatening 
behavior toward U.S. interests, and/or as an enabler 
to the CT strategy. Neither destroying al-Qaeda nor 
rebuilding Afghanistan should be considered distinct 
interests of the United States, but at best are possible 
ways to achieve those interests.
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Second, although Afghanistan has long been a re-
mote backwater on the international stage, it is now 
surrounded by nuclear powers. Four of the powers 
(Russia, China, India, and Pakistan) already possess 
nuclear weapons, while Iran is inching closer to nu-
clear weapons status, raising the risk level if regional 
instability leads to open conflict. Pakistan, through 
its early efforts to develop nuclear weapons and then 
the revelations in 2004 surrounding the activities of A. 
Q. Khan; Iran, more recently as it has upped the level 
of its nuclear program; Russia, as a supplier of fissile 
material and nuclear engineering knowledge to Iran; 
and China, as a supplier of fissile material and nuclear 
engineering knowledge to Pakistan—all have been in-
volved in nuclear proliferation. It cannot be ruled out 
that any or all of these states might engage in future 
nuclear proliferation.25 This threat cannot be ignored 
by the United States, especially given the prospect of 
nuclear proliferation in a region swarming with Is-
lamist radicals, some of whom have a long-standing 
desire to attack the West. 
The multipolar regional environment in and 
around Afghanistan today makes regional stability 
there more important than ever. The primary national 
interest motivating our continued direct involvement 
in Afghanistan is the possibility of spillover violence 
from the modern multipolar struggle for influence 
among the major powers involved there. Two of the 
powers (India and Pakistan) have a long history of 
violent conflict, increasing the likelihood of regional 
instability. India had a long relationship with Russia’s 
predecessor, the Soviet Union, while Pakistan has had 
a similarly long relationship with China, both major 
actors in the region. Given the rivalries and divergent 
interests that exist between these and other countries, 
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potential alliance structures may develop that would 
make conflict between these powers more likely. 
Given the historical rivalry between India and 
Pakistan, and the competition for Asian supremacy 
between China, Russia, and India, the prospects for 
regional instability are significant. As noted earlier, all 
of those countries also possess nuclear arsenals, and 
Iran has been busily pursuing a nuclear capability of 
its own, meaning that all the large countries in Af-
ghanistan’s neighborhood are or soon will be nuclear 
weapons states, raising the stakes of regional instabil-
ity to a dangerously high level. While stability might 
be ensured if one or a combination of the regional 
powers rose to dominate the region, such almost cer-
tainly could not be achieved without destabilizing 
the region. U.S. interests are not advanced by having 
stability ensured by the rise of a successful peer com-
petitor in the area (especially Russia or China, either 
of whom are pursuing interests at variance with im-
portant U.S. interests elsewhere). Achieving the fi-
nal two interests will be challenging, as they require 
maintaining enough presence far from home to ensure 
enough stability in a region where several powerful 
competitors are competing with each other in pursuit 
of divergent interests, while not settling for allowing 
one of the regional competitors to emerge triumphant 
through a misplaced desire to avoid the cost of pres-
ence by way of a proxy. Afghanistan becoming the 
arena for a “proxy war” between Pakistan/China and 
India/Russia is probably the worst case scenario for 
the region.
At most, the first interest is important, but the di-
rect threat to U.S. national security is low. The second 
interest is more important, even vital, if nuclear weap-
ons are used or become insecure. Finally, the last two 
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interests are important but connected to a larger geo-
political puzzle for the United States. Given that no 
critical, vital national security interests now exist in 
Afghanistan (as the nuclear threat seems distant and 
not directed at the United States), it will be difficult to 
motivate the American public to remain engaged in 
Afghanistan in an extensive way, especially since the 
last 12 years have seen significant changes in Afghani-
stan and its region, among the broader Islamic World, 
and globally.
War-weariness and the rise of other threats to 
national security interests have gradually merged to 
move Afghanistan back to its traditional spot on the 
back burner of U.S. foreign policy concerns. As such, 
unless the strategic and economic environments shift 
again, there is little to no chance that the U.S. Gov-
ernment can continue to spend large sums of money 
or deploy more than a tiny fraction of the forces that 
have been used in Afghanistan over the past 12 years 
in the post-2014 time period. Moreover, the United 
States encouraged NATO to commit to the Afghani-
stan mission through the International Security Assis-
tance Force (ISAF), which eventually expanded to be-
come a 49-country coalition.26 Most of these countries 
have now extended their involvement in Afghanistan 
far beyond the time that public opinion will support. 
All of this means that as the national security inter-
est of combating terrorism in Afghanistan fades away, 
probably only two important national interests re-
main, which are to ensure regional stability and fore-
stall rising peer competitors in the region. While both 
interests are important, neither can be considered vital 
after a long and grinding war that has lost its popular-
ity with the American people.
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New Strategies.
The United States now must adjust its strategies 
given changed domestic, regional, and global condi-
tions; flaws in our earlier strategies; and current U.S. 
policy goals for Afghanistan and its immediate region. 
Our existing strategies do not address our present in-
terests and are not sustainable. While they have con-
tributed to the achievement, at least in part, of post-
9/11 U.S. interests in Afghanistan, they have been 
expensive and they do not address the new interests. 
To pursue the current interests at a reasonable cost, 
given Afghanistan’s relative distance from the United 
States but closeness to the Asian powers, we recom-
mend a three-part strategy for post-2014 Afghanistan, 
as follows: 1) Finish destroying al-Qaeda; 2) Continue 
rebuilding Afghanistan; and 3) Regionalize strategy.
The first two pillars of a post-2014 strategy basically 
require reducing the current U.S. involvement and ap-
proach to Afghanistan. Many operational details will 
need to be managed with a high degree of sensitiv-
ity to reduce the U.S. presence in a way that advances 
rather than retards U.S. interests. Such details exceed 
the scope of this analysis, but it would be preferable for 
reductions in U.S. presence to be well planned rather 
than precipitate—certainly it would be best to avoid 
any “helicopters on the Embassy roof” moments.27 
First, the security interest can best be achieved by re-
moving almost all troop presence, closing most bases, 
abandoning all independent combat operations, and 
limiting remaining military presence to CT opera-
tions conducted by special operations forces and/or 
intelligence operatives, as well as military assistance 
and training conducted by regular military forces (the 
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number of forces must be sufficient for their own se-
curity—probably 9,000-12,00028). To maintain enough 
presence to prevent Afghanistan from failing or Chi-
na/Russia/Iran from pursuing unacceptable policies 
will require some form of ongoing military assistance 
program to go along with the robust Embassy and CT 
activities, but it cannot be so expensive and visible as 
to be rejected by U.S. or Afghan public opinion. If a 
viable Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) cannot be 
negotiated to provide sufficient protections for those 
remaining forces, then the United States must negoti-
ate a transitional BSA that will cover them partially 
until such time as they are withdrawn, or in extremis, 
keep them there in the absence of a BSA, an unlikely 
proposition.
Second, the process of rebuilding Afghanistan 
must continue if it is not to become a haven from 
which Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) can 
threaten the world again. Yet, there is little appetite 
in the West for continued engagement in Afghanistan 
beyond the bare minimum required to ensure impor-
tant national security interests. This loss of appetite is 
partly due to the long duration of the Afghan War and 
partly due to the widespread corruption and inepti-
tude of the Afghan government—it is hard to imagine 
a continued funding stream of any significance after 
the bulk of American and NATO forces withdraw. 
This reality produces a policy conundrum in that we 
must prepare to both reduce our involvement and 
signal unequivocally that we are doing so, while at 
the same time take clear steps to indicate a significant 
ongoing presence in the region. We recommend that 
our diplomatic presence in Afghanistan and the re-
gion be reduced and become more regular, but that 
U.S. policymakers resist the temptation to draw down 
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economic investment and aid as rapidly, as those tools 
of policy29 allow us to bolster the Afghan govern-
ment and also allow us to compete with other major 
powers there. 
A related conundrum is that continued economic 
and political development assistance to and through 
the Afghan national government is required if that 
government is ever to mature and political practices 
are to become institutionalized, but the creation of a 
strong central government for Afghanistan is a poor 
fit for its natural social contours or its historical mod-
els of governance.30 That is, the model of government 
envisioned by the Bonn Accords and created by Af-
ghanistan (with U.S. assistance) in 2003 and 2004 is 
fatally flawed and exacerbates the problems of poor 
service delivery, ineptitude, and corruption rather 
than curing or mitigating those political pathologies, 
although such a system does allow outside powers 
to better “game” certain political outcomes in Kabul. 
While a more localized system of government31 would 
probably be better for Afghanistan, it is probably not 
possible for the United States to manage such a trans-
formation even as it is reducing its resources and in-
volvement there. At best, we can probably focus on 
low-key institutional development. A relevant model 
here would be the long-running Peace Corps program 
that has had such a positive effect in many countries—
including Afghanistan—for U.S. interests.
The first two pillars to the strategy will not address 
the last two national interests remaining for the United 
States in Afghanistan—namely, to prevent a regional 
power struggle between rival powers that could lead 
to regional instability, and in particular to prevent the 
eruption of a regional conflict between nuclear pow-
ers; and to potentially prevent the rise of a regional 
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power or alliance of powers whose interests run coun-
ter to U.S interests. Nor is there a clear-cut strategy 
that can be pursued that will have a good chance of 
achieving these interests. Nonetheless, we recommend 
that the United States at least regionalize its approach 
to Afghanistan. The key, as already outlined, will be 
to maintain enough presence to be able to prevent a 
regional war between rivals in and around Afghani-
stan, while disengaging the bulk of our combat forces 
already present in Afghanistan and reducing the size 
and footprint of our diplomatic mission there. Wield-
ing the diplomatic scalpel deftly to manipulate region-
al actors to our own ends is fraught with peril, but 
probably necessary. A major challenge, however, is 
that the U.S. Government structures its foreign and na-
tional security policy apparatus around country teams 
and regional desks. Afghanistan sits at the juncture of 
four regions—East Asia (because of China), Central 
Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East—and there is 
no institutional arrangement within the U.S. Govern-
ment that ties all of these regions together. The Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan position 
that was created in the State Department in 2009 is a 
step in this direction, but the position is housed within 
only one department of the executive branch and only 
focuses on two of the relevant countries. Moreover, 
illustrating the broader bureaucratic problem, the 
State Department still maintains regional bureaus and 
country teams that dominate the policy and opera-
tional environment for the relevant countries. What is 
required is a change in attitude and organization to 
achieve U.S. interests concerning Afghanistan.
That is, the United States may have to go beyond 
a regional approach and globalize its approach to Af-
ghanistan. We propose an institutional reform to the 
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U.S. national security structure to allow for a global 
grand strategy to be developed by an interagency cell 
within the National Security Council. Personnel sec-
onded to this cell should represent relevant national 
security agencies and departments, as well as draw on 
academics from universities and think tanks. Those 
strategists that work in this entity will be tasked with 
not only developing a grand strategy, but also recom-
mending strategic adjustments to the National Secu-
rity Adviser and President as the strategy develops. 
What they must master is not only an understanding 
of how major rivals pursue their interests in a global 
context, but how the United States can weave together 
and wield all of its tools of national power in an effec-
tive way to counter the strategies of rivals as they play 
out around the world.32 
A last strategy consideration has to do with sustain-
able governance in Afghanistan. The U.S. approach 
to extricating itself from protracted limited wars has 
centered on security assistance, other institutional re-
form, and state-building more generally. Inevitably, 
the United States has to become deeply involved with 
indigenous politicians and their support networks to 
make such an approach work. In post-9/11 Afghani-
stan, this involvement was especially intrusive, as the 
strategy called for not only picking winners and los-
ers, but also constructing an entirely new Afghan po-
litical, economic, and social institutional framework. 
This political reconstruction occurred in one of 
the most localized societies on the planet, where the 
concept of “all politics is local” describes the reality 
of political life for most people. The political reality of 
Afghanistan is that an Afghan’s identity significantly 
revolves around a local environ and/or identity group. 
For most of its history, Afghanistan had a central gov-
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ernment that could not intrude very heavily into the 
countryside, as strong centrifugal social and political 
forces existed in an uneasy balance with the tenuous 
authority of the central government. Afghanistan’s 
social order today remains profoundly tilted toward 
the local, even as the large diaspora population of 
Afghans in the West is now connected with relatives 
back home to an extent that has never before existed 
in human history. Thus, the profound localism may be 
changing under our feet.33 
Afghanistan’s population is characterized by deep 
and multifaceted cleavages. People are divided basi-
cally along ethnic and linguistic lines, but sectarian, 
tribal, and racial divisions also exist, and all of these 
are reinforced by a spatial pattern of population distri-
bution into different regions of the country. That level 
of complexity does not even do justice to the reality, 
which is that every village, district, and region of the 
country are different. The localized country means 
that the religious framework is based on a syncretic 
blend of various interpretations of Islamic doctrine 
with local customs, making the country simultane-
ously unified by one faith and divided by hundreds 
of variations on its practice.34 In a country where 
tribal social groupings still exist, the social system is 
based on communal loyalties and emphasizes the lo-
cal over higher-order identity formations. The rugged 
topographical features and geographical position of 
Afghanistan, coupled with its lack of economic devel-
opment, isolate it internationally and magnify the dis-
tance of its people from the government. Often these 
factors combine to reinforce each other, other times 
they overlap each other, but collectively they create a 
complex foundation for modern Afghan politics. 
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The post-9/11 political reconstruction was further 
shaped by the reality that Afghanistan’s traditional 
ruler, King Zahir Shah, had been absent from Afghani-
stan since 1973 while his fellow Durrani Pashtuns had 
been marginalized during much of that period. Much 
of the rest of the Pashtun population had participated 
on one side or another of the long Afghan War of the 
1980s and 1990s, and by 9/11 most Pashtuns were 
in the Taliban camp, as that movement had become 
something of a political vehicle for Pashtun national 
aspirations. Positioned in opposition was a fractious 
alliance of mostly minority ethnic groups from the 
center and north of the country (hence the “Northern 
Alliance”). 
The United States leveraged Northern Alliance 
militias and their warlord commanders to topple the 
Taliban government in 2001, while simultaneously 
picking Durrani Pashtun Hamid Karzai to put a Pash-
tun face on what would otherwise be a government 
dominated by northern minority leaders. Karzai’s 
subsequent election victories allowed him to remain 
the face of the Afghanistan government, even as wide-
spread, endemic corruption undermined its legitima-
cy to those in the population not directly benefitting 
from his rule. Moreover, Karzai worked over the past 
decade to limit the prospects of any challengers to his 
position, meaning that there are few subordinate lead-
ers from the Pashtun ethnic group that even have a 
unified Pashtun following (hard to achieve anyway 
given that ethnicity’s tribal makeup). 
The United States continues to emphasize institu-
tional development, especially of the Afghan National 
Security Forces, which the U.S. military continues to 
train and assist to fight a largely Pashtun insurgency. 
This means that the United States has few good in-
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digenous options in Afghanistan through which to 
pursue its strategy.
Constraints and Risks.
In post-2014 Afghanistan, the United States cannot 
afford to fail to ensure regional stability and forestall 
rising peer competitors from gaining too much influ-
ence in the region. Significant constraints and risks ex-
ist. In the short term, Afghanistan is about to undergo 
a major political transition, as post-Taliban President 
Hamid Karzai finishes his second term in office in 
2014 and will have to give way to a new President 
(unless he pulls off some political legerdemain that 
allows him to extend his stay in the Presidential Pal-
ace beyond the constitutionally mandated limit). The 
presidential election of April 2014 (the first ballot) and 
June 2014 (the second ballot, or runoff) provided an 
opportunity to change the way Afghanistan has been 
governed since 2001, and perhaps even find a way to 
end the long civil war that has tortured the country.35 
Or maybe not. The runoff election between the two 
largest vote getters—Abdullah Addullah and Ashraf 
Ghani, ended in acrimony and finger pointing, as 
Abdullah and his supporters made strong complaints 
of substantial electoral fraud, calling into question the 
validity of the election. As noted previously, the polit-
ical system given form by the 2004 Constitution does 
not fit Afghan society. No matter which candidate 
emerges as the next president of Afghanistan, if the 
election is to be anything other than a rearrangement 
of the deck chairs on the Titanic, important political, 
economic, and social reforms will need to be imple-
mented. In particular, a way must be found to localize 
governance, reduce exorbitant corruption, and accom-
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modate the aspirations of Afghanistan’s increasingly 
globalized youth for social change.
Second, the regional multipolar power struggle 
means that all actors will continue to pursue their 
interests inside and around Afghanistan, probably 
using intelligence agents and assets and proxy forc-
es, especially if the United States and NATO troops 
remain in any sizable force. This reality means that 
a successful reconciliation and reintegration process 
with the various factions of the Taliban is virtually 
impossible to achieve so long as the Taliban remain 
somewhat of a proxy for Pakistan. Given the growing 
Indian relationship with and presence in Afghanistan 
and the ties by ethnicity, sectarianism, and/or money 
between other regional countries with other proxies 
inside Afghanistan, it is extremely difficult to imagine 
Pakistan giving up its proxy.
Exacerbating this problem are the growing global 
Great Power rivalries between the United States and 
both a rising China and a resurgent Russia, which 
are playing out in multiple arenas by way of many 
actors and various strategies. For example, China’s 
greater assertiveness in the East and South China Sea 
has prompted the United States to pivot to the Pacific, 
or vice versa, depending upon your point of view. 
Likewise, China’s increasing pursuit of resources in 
the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America has col-
lided with American national security interests in 
those regions, especially (for example) the Syrian civil 
war and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Russia’s 
revanchist annexation of Crimea, the 2008 war with 
Georgia, and support for the Bashar Al-Assad regime 
in Syria all illustrate a return to a Cold War-style ex-
pectation of Great Power status within its immediate 
neighborhood that collides with American aspirations 
for a peaceful European Union.
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Another complication is that long-term and large-
scale Western military presence in Afghanistan cannot 
be contemplated, given the difficulty in securing an 
adequate BSA between Afghanistan and the United 
States. Also operating as significant constraints are the 
limits imposed by the economic recession in Europe 
and the United States, the pervasive war-weariness 
on both sides of the Atlantic, the widespread percep-
tion that the oft-stated military goals for the Afghan 
War have been achieved, and the persistent regional 
and local interests that diverge from and threaten 
America’s military presence and interests.
Finally, all of the foregoing suggests that any sub-
stantial American withdrawal or disengagement from 
Afghanistan will lead to a deepening of the civil war 
already underway there. The Taliban will not be the 
only proxy for a regional power, nor will Pakistan’s 
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate be the only in-
telligence service to play a role inside Afghanistan. As 
already noted, a civil war in Afghanistan now threat-
ens to unhinge the region in a way that the war of the 
1990s never could. Should an Afghan civil war cause 
regional instability, U.S. interests will be harmed, 
especially if such a war were to widen or turn into a 
general or nuclear war. 
Conclusion.
The United States started this century in its tradi-
tional position of ignoring Afghanistan. The events 
of 9/11 forced the United States to change that posi-
tion. America’s longest war has taken place since then 
on Afghan soil, and that war in concert with the long 
war in Iraq and the military operations elsewhere 
against Islamist terrorists have combined to produce 
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deep war-weariness among the American public. Few 
Americans have any desire to remain engaged in Af-
ghanistan to any extent after the planned withdrawal 
of American forces concludes in 2014. However, the 
historical lesson provided by the American decision 
to turn its attention away from the region following 
the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 that ultimately led 
to the rise of the Taliban and fostering of al-Qaeda, 
combined with the multipolar power struggle in the 
region, mean that the United States cannot afford to 
fully disengage from Afghanistan again. Thus, the 
American withdrawal will most likely follow the strat-
egy guidance laid out previously—namely, the CT or-
ganizations will continue to conduct activities in the 
region, from which Afghanistan will provide a logical 
platform; the customary diplomatic and foreign assis-
tance approaches of the U.S. government, especially 
the security assistance programs, will continue, both 
to provide the platform for the CT operators and pres-
ence for the United States vis-à-vis its regional rivals; 
and American intelligence and military assets that can 
monitor and tamp down the risks of regional instabil-
ity in a nuclear fault zone will also continue. 
Afghanistan’s place in the American conscious-
ness will necessarily fade, hopefully, as the United 
States moves to draw down its presence and involve-
ment there. As with all limited wars, however, it is dif-
ficult to declare the Afghan War a victory. Objectives 
achieved fall mostly in the category of possible pre-
vention of further terrorist attacks, and those successes 
(if any) came by way of costly strategies that were in-
tertwined with America’s war in Iraq and operations 
against Islamist terrorists. The very exit strategy from 
Afghanistan is reminiscent of the “Vietnamization” 
strategy of an earlier era36 and dangerously flawed 
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thereby because when the United States finally pulled 
out of Vietnam, there was no stomach to go back in if 
the South Vietnamese troops needed help; hence, that 
strategy quickly failed.37 Thus, even the limited, low-
key approach suggested here is risky in the current 
political and economic climate of the United States, 
meaning that it is possible that the United States will 
set aside any reasonable strategy to achieve its legiti-
mate national security interests in the Afghanistan 
region after 2014.
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